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Do NGAN Economics Allow  
for Network Competition? 




Abstract:  This article analyses whether the economics of Next Generation Access 
Networks for broadband services allow for the market to be competitive in Europe in 
absence of ex ante regulation of wholesale network access. This is done by two methods: 
cost modelling of operators with different technologies and market shares, and the review 
of market entry decisions by European operators. Both methods arrive at the same 
conclusions: a) network economics allow competition in most geographic areas between 
two to four operators; b) the economics of NGANs will lead to different industry structures 
in different geographic areas; c) even where there is not a pre-existing cable operator, 
other entrants can successfully deploy their networks and challenge the incumbent 
telecommunications operator; and d) price levels and availability of ducts greatly increase 
the degree of potential competition. 
Key words: regulation, competition, broadband, access networks, fibre optic. 
 
n this article, we intend to discuss the feasibility and sustainability of 
network competition between several fibre-based telecommunications 
access networks. Given that previous research has proved that 
competitive conditions (and therefore, expected industry structures) will be 
very different in different geographic settings 1, this analysis, to be relevant, 
has to be conducted in geographically homogeneous areas, thus usually 
requiring to divide a country into several sub-markets 2. 
Infrastructure competition exists in most of Europe with current 
broadband technologies (DSL, cable, UMTS, satellite and other wireless). 
This is not surprising, for in free markets competition is in general feasible 
where no legal limitations to entry and exit are in place. However, sometimes 
economic entry barriers may impede competition because they grant to the 
                       
1 As an example, see SORIA & HERNÁNDEZ-GIL (2008). 
2 This has led several European National Regulatory Authorities to define several geographic 
sub-markets to analyse competition in broadband markets. This has already happened in the 
United Kingdom and Portugal and to a lesser extent in Austria, and is the ordinary practice in 
the USA (SORIA, 2008).   
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incumbent provider insurmountable advantages. There is fear in some 
circles that the renewal of access networks with NGN technologies may be 
such a case, for it might modify the economics of the business to the degree 
of making platform competition impossible in many places of Europe. 
Therefore, we will focus on finding an answer to the question: is there 
any economic obstacle that prevents more than one network operator from 
operating a fibre-based network with a sustainable business plan  3 in the 
same geographic area? We have analysed this issue in Telefónica's 
regulatory team. This article presents a summary of our findings: 
•  In the first part, we perform a cost modelling analysis of several 
technologies to explore the conditions under which the cost advantage of the 
largest player is contestable by smaller players or new entrants.  
•  In the second part, we check whether the actual behaviour of players 
in the markets in which NGAN deployment has already begun is consistent 
with the patterns that we can infer from the conclusions of the cost 
modelling.  
To finish, we extract some conclusions and implications for the economic 
and regulatory debates underway. 
We follow a technology neutral approach, thus defining a given service 
performance and after that modelling the costs of an operator that wishes to 
provide this service using any technology that supports it. We consider three 
wireline technologies: FTTH, VDSL (FTTN) and HFC with DOCSIS 2.0 or 
3.0 cable modems. When considering NGAN services in the range of 20 
Mbps, we also take into account wireless technologies (such as WiMAX 4). 
To ensure that the results do not depend on specific know-how from a 
company, we have chosen COSTA, a cost model that uses publicly available 
network modelling algorithms and prices from public sources (manufacturers 
or consultant reports). The analysis covers a number of the most 
representative scenarios in Europe, and their conclusions are valid for these 
scenarios. It is not intended to be comprehensive, and it cannot be ruled out 
that in other geographic or service scenarios the results be different. 
                       
3 We consider a business plan to be sustainable if the ordinary operations of the company can 
generate, over the lifetime of the network assets, a return on the capital invested that is equal or 
higher than the cost of capital. 
4 We have used WiMAX because LTE economics are not yet well known. Since most of the 
network elements are the same or very similar, we expect LTE costs to be quite in line with 
WiMAX ones. However, this point will need an update in one or two years' time.   B. SORIA & F. HERNÁNDEZ-GIL  25 
   Network cost modelling 5  
Analysis of cost functions 
Analytical tools: the COSTA model 
There are several potential analytical approaches to the assessment of 
the prospective industry structure after the introduction of NGN technology. 
We have chosen the analysis of potential end games after the full 
replacement of current networks by NGN technologies. To assess the 
impact of NGANs in market structure, the cost functions of operators running 
NGAN networks of different technologies at different penetration and market 
share points have been obtained using the COSTA model, an engineering 
model developed by Universidad Politécnica de Madrid 6 with support from 
Telefónica. Cost data for different scenarios have been afterwards fed into 
simple profitability analyses to assess the sustainability of operators with 
different market shares and technologies. COSTA model calculates the 
monthly network cost of a broadband access connection using one of three 
NGAN technologies: fibre (FFTH –GPON- or FTTN7 -VDSL2-), cable 
(DOCSIS 2.0 and 3.0) or wireless (WiMAX). Current non-NGAN 
technologies like ADSL or GPRS are not included in the current version. 
Capex and Opex data are also produced. COSTA model calculates cost 
functions for five different geographic settings, defined by their population 
density: Dense urban, Urban, Suburban, Rural and Sparse rural. It assumes 
flat terrain and a uniform distribution of homes within an area comprising 
65,000 customer premises. All homes are passed, but the cost of vertical 
connection and in house equipment is only incurred when the customer is 
connected. Since these hypotheses are very favourable, but affect in a very 
similar manner all technologies, the results usually explain correctly the 
relationship between technologies in real world situations, but underestimate 
to a certain degree the actual costs. 
                       
5 We summarise in this section the analysis that we already presented in SORIA & 
HERNÁNDEZ-GIL (2008) and our contributions to the economic annexes of ETNO (2008) and 
ETNO (2009). 
6 Specifications and definitions of COSTA model (COSTes de redes de Acceso –COST of 
Access networks) can be found at http://www.gtic.ssr.upm.es/costa/costa.html. 
7 We refer to VDSL2 technology as FTTN in general, because depending on home density and 
service penetration the node where VDSL equipment is hosted could be located in the building's 
basement (FTTB), in the curb close to the building (FTTB) or in any other place. 26     No. 78, 2
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Relevant unit of analysis 
Differences between geographic areas 
The first result that the model yields is that the economics of NGAN are 
very different in different geographic areas, to the extent that the expected 
industry structures are very different. Cost leaders are not likely to be the 
same, for they use different technologies, and the different inflection points 
at which economies of scale exhaust allow for a different number of 
operators to be in a position of cost parity. If the case of standard speed 
Internet connections is considered, fixed networks are likely to be more 
successful in high density areas, whilst wireless are best suited for rural 
ones. The main conclusion is that, since the economics of NGANs are so 
different from area to area, every kind of geographic area has to be analysed 
in a separate way.  
Differences driven by service or connection speed 
The type of service that users demand also impacts on industry structure. 
In addition to different cost functions for the same technology when 
delivering different services, the platforms available for different speeds are 
not the same. For example, wireless technologies can deliver speeds below 
20 Mbps, but not (yet) higher. Therefore, markets in which customers 
demand different speeds should also be analysed separately. 
   Specific analysis: very high speed services in urban 
areas with uniform customer demand 
The analysis of the sustainability of infrastructure competition has to be 
done separately for different geographic areas and service features. For the 
sake of brevity, one area and service type will be analysed. We find urban 
and dense urban areas to be the most relevant, since together they amount 
for more than one half of the European population and are the ones in which 
infrastructure competition has usually existed for the longer time (normally 
between DSL and cable), and therefore the ones in which any eventual 
threat of diminished competition because of NGAN deployment could have B. SORIA & F. HERNÁNDEZ-GIL  27 
the highest impact. Dense urban areas 8 need not a thorough analysis, for 
competition between several fibre networks already exists in many European 
cities, where metropolitan fibre operators like Colt, Verizon or utility-backed 
city carriers compete with the incumbent telephone operator and usually also 
with one cable. Our analysis will therefore focus in urban areas  9. As for 
service speeds, we have seen that medium and basic speeds leave room for 
more competition because of wireless networks. Since very high speed 
services are the ones in which fewer platforms could compete, very high 
speed services (100 Mbps connections) were selected to be sure that the 
most difficult scenario was covered. We have also assumed that all 
customers demand the same speed. As can be seen in SORIA & 
HERNÁNDEZ-GIL (2008), when customer demand is more heterogeneous, 
there is room for more operators than otherwise. Therefore, we can also 
assume that if there is room for competition at high speeds with 
homogeneous demand, the degree of competition will be equal or higher as 
demand becomes less demanding or more heterogeneous. Of course, 
additional analyses have to be conducted for other geographic and service 
scenarios in due time. 
Greenfield scenario 
The scenario of full infrastructure construction (greenfield) will be 
analysed as the base case. As we showed in SORIA & HERNÁNDEZ-GIL 
(2008) cable reaches minimum cost at a penetration /market share lower 
than fibre networks. This suggests that cable operators can have a first 
mover cost advantage if they deploy their networks before the incumbent 
telephone operator or the unbundlers. We can also see that price is an 
important driver of the number of operators that can profitably compete in a 
market at any given service take up rate. Because of economies of 
density 10 in the left part of the cost curve, low prices will increase the 
minimum size needed to make a profit.  
                       
8 COSTA model, following the criteria of the European project MUSE, takes a density of 7,187 
user locations per km
2 for dense urban areas. 
9 COSTA model, following the criteria of the European project MUSE, takes a density of 3,116 
user locations per km
2 for urban areas 
10 Density economies are a particular case of scale economies, which are constrained to a 
given area. Within this area, the highest the number of customers, the lowest the unit cost, but 
having a large scale in one area does not confer any cost advantage in another one. 28     No. 78, 2
nd Q. 2010 
When we model the impact of price levels in the market structure, we see 
that the maximum potential number of profitable operators decreases 
sharply with average revenue. Next figure shows the NPV of full 
infrastructure-owning fibre operators in an urban area that offer 100 Mbps 
service at different wholesale ARPU levels  11 over a 15 year period. The 
minimum number of connected homes 12 that an operator needs to get to be 
able to break even is not very high for wholesale ARPUs of 30 euros and 
above, but increase sharply below those revenue levels.   























This means that the maximum number of competing operators (assuming 
equal market shares and 100% service penetration), depending on the 
revenue per connection, is not only greater than one, but might be very high. 
Since penetration is not likely to be universal nor market shares to be equal, 
when the penetration rate of the service is taken into account, a potential 
number of market structures arise. It may be seen in figure 2 that, the higher 
the total penetration rate, the higher the number of potential profitable 
network competitors. However, it should not be forgotten that, a low 
penetration rate of high speed services means that there are many 
customers purchasing lower speed services, which in turn can make 
profitable other operators running cheaper, lower performance technologies. 
                       
11 Assuming a WACC of 10%, thanks to no regulatory risk. 
12 This number is related to market share and total service take up by a simple formula:  
Connected homesi = Total connected homes * Market share
i ii    . .. B. SORIA & F. HERNÁNDEZ-GIL  29 
Infrastructure competition in the case of low penetrations will then be more 
inter-modal than intra-modal. It can be concluded that, for realistic 
penetration rates and ARPU levels, cost functions do not impede sustainable 
competition between several fibre operators in a Greenfield scenario. 









































The impact of duct ownership and access to third party ducts 
Up to this point, we have analysed a Greenfield case. However, this is 
rarely the case. There is usually some infrastructure in the ground that can 
be used or re-used to build the NGN. This is especially true for passive 
infrastructure: ducts, poles, manholes, street cabinets, base station sites and 
antennae masts, that count for most of the investments needed. Operators 
deciding to build a new network are motivated to use existing passive 
infrastructure to reduce their investments, willing to reimburse the passive 
infrastructure's owner for the use. 13 A market for passive infrastructures can 
develop without regulatory intervention simply because of the economics of 
their owners' businesses: (i) ducts are a capital intensive asset with (ii) 
strong economies of density, and in which, provided there is spare capacity, 
third party fibre cables can be roomed at (iii) a very low incremental cost. 
                       
13 By "reasonable" we mean a price that allows the infrastructure owner to cover all its costs 
(including costs of capital), but not to make a monopoly profit on infrastructure leases. 30     No. 78, 2
nd Q. 2010 
Therefore, any lease revenue will have a strong beneficial impact in the duct 
owner's margins. Ducts that have already been used to deploy fibre optic 
cables include electricity cables and poles, sewers, service galleries, water, 
oil and gas pipes, railway and road tunnels, etc. For example, Fastweb 
deployed its fibre optic network in Milan by using the rights of way of utility 
company AEM, and Free is using municipal ducts alongside tramway tracks 
in Montpellier.Telecommunications regulatory authorities may also impose 
the mandate to lease space in their ducts to competing fibre operators as a 
remedy to operators that have been found to have SMP in a relevant market. 
For the sake of the economic argument, it makes no difference whether this 
offer is a commercial one or has been imposed to telephone operators or 
other utilities by regulators.  
When the availability of existing civil infrastructure is taken into account, 
relevant changes in the cost and profitability of operators happen with 
relation to the Greenfield base case. Two different situations are analysed: 
that of an incumbent operator that already owns the ducts needed to deploy 
an NGN, and that of a new entrant that leases the ducts it needs. In this 
case, in order to perform a robust analysis, a lease price of 6 euro/metre of 
duct is considered, which is well above the lease prices that are charged in 
most markets. 
To simplify the presentation of the results, three revenue scenarios were 
considered: (i) a premium, (ii) a medium and (iii) a basic ARPU 14. In the 
case of premium ARPU, it can be seen that the financial prospects for both 
incumbents and new entrants are a great improvement over the Greenfield 
scenario (figure 3). Cable operators consolidate a very advantageous 
position, whilst incumbent and alternative fibre operators have very similar 
business cases, as leasing ducts allows new entrants to reap significant 
savings in capital and/or interest cost because they have to finance a much 
smaller upfront investment, even if they incur some increase in their 
operational expenses. When this data is used to calculate the profitability 
threshold for competitors to be viable, the competitive conditions also 
improve. In the premium scenario, the minimum market share for a FTTH 
operator (incumbent or new entrant) to become profitable falls from 37% to 
23% at penetration rates as low as 30% (figure 4). 
                       
14 "Premium" (customers which make full use of advanced services enabled by fibre) are 
assumed to yield a wholesale ARPU of 50 euro; "Medium" (customers that value the enhanced 
performance of fibre to deliver the current broadband service suite) at 40 euro; "Basic" (other 
customers) at 30 euro. B. SORIA & F. HERNÁNDEZ-GIL  31 
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Of course, lower revenues would diminish the number of competitors, but 
not necessarily impede competition. The analysis for basic monthly 
revenues (figure 5) shows that the availability of ducts greatly enhances the 
profitability of all operators and lowers the market share to break even. This 
makes room for competition at penetration rates around 40%, especially 
where there is already competition between cable and DSL. 32     No. 78, 2
nd Q. 2010 
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We shall now provide an estimate about by how much the number of 
sustainable competitors can increase when access to ducts is available. For 
the sake of simplicity; we assume all operators use FTTH GPON network 
architecture. Potential supply by other operators is taken into account by 
considering a total FTTH service take up of 50%, which is similar to the 
current average broadband penetration levels in Europe. The rest of 
households are supposed to either use cable modem access using DOCSIS 
3.0, mobile-only broadband access, legacy DSL access where available, or 
to not use broadband at all. To consider the impact on competition of those 
other providers, we add 0-1 operators to the FTTH ones in the "other" 
column. This gives us a low threshold of the number of operators. 
To test the impact of duct access in the degree of competitive rivalry in 
the market, the COSTA model was run to find the break even point of fibre 
operators, i.e. the minimum percentage of premises in a given area that an 
operator needs to have as customers in order to become net present value 
(NPV) positive in a 15 year period in different geographic settings and 
average revenue per user (ARPU) levels. After this result, the maximum 
number of operators  15 that a service area can sustain is calculated for 
several service take up levels. The results from the COSTA model show that 
the number of operators significantly increases with access to duct leasing in 
                       
15 Assuming that all operators have equal market shares. B. SORIA & F. HERNÁNDEZ-GIL  33 
all cases. For premium ARPU (Table 1), duct leasing increases the number 
of competitors across the board, bringing markets that already had the 
potential to be competitive to a high degree of intra-modal competitiveness. 
In the medium ARPU scenario (Table 2), duct access may bring competition 
to suburban areas where fibre would have otherwise competed only with 
high speed cable and wireless broadband, and may also greatly enhance 
the competitive effectiveness of urban areas. In the basic ARPU scenario 
(Table 3), the business case for investing in fibre networks would be more 
difficult to be profitable, but the competitive impact of having ducts for lease 
would be greater than in the previous cases. Urban areas would sustain 
several fibre operators (in addition to the cable one) and dense urban areas 
could justify investment by three fibre operators. 
Table 1 – Maximum number of operators – 100 Mbps, premium ARPU, 50% penetration 
Built ducts  Leased ducts 
Area 
Market share 
threshold  FTTH Other Total Market share 
threshold  FTTH Other Total 
Dense 
urban  18%  5 0-1  5-6  14%  7 0-1  7-8 
Urban  24%  4 0-1  4-5  18%  5 0-1  5-6 
Suburban  38%  2 0-1  2-3  28%  3 0-1  3-4 
Table 2 - Maximum number of operators - 100 Mbps, medium ARPU, 50% penetration 
Built ducts  Leased ducts 
Area 
Market share 
threshold  FTTH Other Total Market share 
threshold  FTTH Other Total 
Dense 
urban  24%  4 0-1  3-4  20%  5 0-1  5-6 
Urban  34%  2 0-1  2-3  24%  4 0-1  4-5 
Suburban  52%  1 0-1  1-2  38%  2 0-1  2-3 
Table 3 - Maximum number of operators - 100 Mbps, basic ARPU, 50% penetration 
Built ducts  Leased ducts 
Area 
Market share 
threshold  FTTH Other Total Market share 
threshold  FTTH Other Total 
Dense 
urban  40%  2 0-1  2-3  32%  3 0-1  3-4 
Urban  52%  1 0-1  1-2  40%  2 0-1  2-3 
Suburban  84%  1 0-1  1-2  60%  1 0-1  1-2 34     No. 78, 2
nd Q. 2010 
Discussion of other studies 
These findings are in line with those of other recent studies, especially 
when one adjusts for the different geographic and market scenarios 
analyses. For example, ISDEFE (2009), a study commissioned by CMT, the 
Spanish NRA, assuming that duct leasing was in place, found that: 
•  Up to six infrastructure-based fixed NGA operators could compete in 
the two largest cities (Madrid and Barcelona): Telefónica, the cable operator 
and up to four alternative fibre operators; 
•  Two to four infrastructure-based fixed NGA operators could compete 
in cities and towns down to 1,000 inhabitants: Telefónica, one fibre 
alternative, the cable operator, and a second fibre alternative in large cities.  
An older study by NEUMANN et al. (2008), commissioned by ECTA, the 
association of service providers over leased local networks, arrives at more 
restrictive conclusions about the potential for infrastructure competition in 
NGANs in several European countries. However, it should be noted that 
their results are based in very narrow assumptions, and therefore could not 
be valid if one or more of those assumptions are not met. In particular: 
•  It only considers one price scenario. As we have seen, the number of 
potential networks is highly dependent to variations in ARPU. 
•  It ignores cable networks. Since they are the best placed to migrate to 
NGAN, this understates the number of networks and the extension of 
competitive areas. 
•  It applies different parameters to evaluate the profitability incumbent 
telephone operator and the unbundlers' business plans:  
- Even when they correctly analyse different geographic areas 
separately, they assume the incumbent's market share to be the average 
national one in all areas. Since incumbents usually have a much higher 
share in rural areas and much lower in urban ones, this understates the 
potential for urban competition. 
-  Instead of assessing all business cases on their own merits, they also 
consider the sources of financing of the incumbent, but not the 
unbundlers'. Deducting from the incumbent's investment the proceedings 
of the sale of central office buildings understates their investments. 
-  They assume that the incumbent's WACC is lower than the 
unbundlers'. This is not always the case, especially when they face a 
strong cable company, unbundlers that subsidiaries of other countries' 
incumbents, or a big utility. By depressing the profitability of entrants, this 
arrives at a smaller number of alternative operators. B. SORIA & F. HERNÁNDEZ-GIL  35 
   Analysis of actual deployment data 
We would like to check with empirical data whether the conclusions of 
our cost model were correct. Because of the early stage of market 
development, no complete data about NGA market structure exist yet. 
Industry structure is the result of the interaction between supply (entry 
decisions plus subsequent commercial competition) and demand. At this 
stage, only the entry decisions can be observed. Therefore, we will review in 
this section whether the entry decision pattern is consistent with the pattern 
that can be inferred from the results of our cost modelling. Of course, this 
does not prove or disprove our conclusions about the endgame industry 
structure, but at least it shows whether our conclusions about the prospects 
for network competition are shared by players in the industry when they 
decide whether, where and when to invest their money. 
Expected investment behaviour of different industry players 
After the findings of our cost modelling, we can infer some patterns that 
one will expect to see in any given market, assuming all players are rational 
and regulation does not favour one specific business model or operator 
class over the others. Our first inference is that investors will see the 
market as competitive. Therefore, several companies will invest in each 
area, the final number depending on geographic and market conditions. 
Even more, first movers will not be perceived as having an enduring 
advantage, and when the number of operators in a market is lower than the 
maximum estimated, new entrants will come to the market and invest to 
deploy their own networks. In second place, we infer that, given that 
ownership of some assets gives advantage over brand new entrants, 
deployment of NGANs is likely to be done in most cases by companies 
that already own infrastructure assets. However, where ducts are 
available for lease, or not enough industry players enter the NGAN turf, 
brand new entrants have an opportunity to deploy their networks and build a 
sustainable business case. Our third inference is that the investment 
behaviour of players of different natures is likely to be different. 
Different players have different assets, which deliver different synergies with 
different NGA technologies, which in turn offer different performance to 
customers. Because of that, some of them may take advantage of being first 
movers, whilst others might prefer to be reactive. 
•  Cable operators are likely to be first movers. They can achieve a 
better cost position than FTTH/FTTN operators and deploy NGAN services 36     No. 78, 2
nd Q. 2010 
in a much shorter time. Moreover, services over DOCSIS 3.0 have lower 
performance at very high speeds than FTTH, especially in the uplink. Cable 
operators have therefore a window of opportunity to grab market share 
before their competitors have had material time to deploy their services. 
•  Since DOCSIS 3.0 equipment was available only late in 2007, cable 
operators in areas where other players had already deployed fibre networks 
by that date are likely to react quickly and upgrade their networks soon. 
•  Utilities will invest soon to compensate with an early entry the lead of 
cable and DSL operators' broadband customer base. 
•  Incumbent telecoms companies have no incentive to be proactive, for 
they suffer asymmetrical regulation and in many cases regulatory 
uncertainty. One would expect, therefore, that they wait before investing, 
until either they are deregulated 16 or they need to match the service offers 
of competitors that have already deployed their networks.  
•  Other players that do not own infrastructure assets, like broadband 
providers over LLU or pure start-ups, may also consider entering the market. 
They are likely to do so either as very early first movers, to leverage their 
customer base if they have access to ducts, or if only one or two 
infrastructure-based operators have deploying NGANs, so that the assetless 
operator has a good chance to be second or third in the market. 
Empirical evidence of patterns of NGAN investment 
As we have noted before, the only empirical data we have available at 
this time is the entry decisions of operators. We have reviewed the evidence 
of the launch of NGAN deployment in 11 European countries. Specifically, 
we have used the number of operators in each market, their initial business 
and the launch dates to check whether: 
-  there are several operators competing in each area, 
-  companies entering the market own assets reusable to NGANs, 
-  the time of entry of the players of each type is consistent with the 
generic strategies identified in the previous section. 
 
                       
16 This could be observed in the USA, when the biggest incumbent telcos (Verizon and AT&T) 
began the massive deployment of their NGANs just after the FCC deregulated their broadband 
offers and fibre networks in 2003. B. SORIA & F. HERNÁNDEZ-GIL  37 
Table 4 - Summary of entry decisions 
  Several 
operators 








Germany  √  √  √  √ X 
Portugal  √ X  X  X  √ 
Italy  √  √  √  √ N/A 
France  √ X  √  √ N/A 
Switzerland  √  √  √  √  √ 
Netherlands  √ X  √  √  √ 
Denmark  √  √  √  √ N/A 
Belgium  √  √ X  X  √ 
Spain  √  √  √  √ N/A 
United Kingdom  √  √  √  √ N/A 
Czech Republic  √  √  √  √  √ 
Total 11/11  8/11  9/11  9/11  5/6 
The results from this analysis are summarised in Table 4 (the detailed 
data tables for most countries can be seen in Annex). According to these 
results, NGAN deployment in most countries is happening in a way 
consistent with the patterns predicted by our cost model. In addition to the 
finding that there is competition in areas of all countries, it should be noted 
that several cities have already more than two NGAN operators. In addition, 
we can also note that several operators have deemed entry to be feasible 
even when there is (or are) other ones already in the market, for they have 
deployed NGANs one or more years later than their competitors. 
Table 5 - Selected European cities with more than 2 NGAN networks 
Operators  City 
FTTX Cable Total 
Paris (France)  3  1  4 
Hamburg (Germany)  2  1  3 
Lisbon (Portugal)  2  1  3 
Amsterdam (NL)  2  1  3 
Porto (Portugal)  2  1  3 
Pilsen (Czech Rep.)  2  1  3 
Brno (Czech Rep.)  2  1  3 
   Conclusions and implications 
The economics of NGANs allow for competition between several very 
high speed broadband operators, each of which with its own network, at 
least in geographic areas where most of the European population lives, even 
absent any access regulation. Industry structure is expected to vary greatly 38     No. 78, 2
nd Q. 2010 
with population density, ARPU, service take-up, user demand requirements 
and the availability of civil infrastructure. 
• Population density and user requirements will drive which 
technologies have the best cost position, thus allowing very different industry 
structures in different areas 
•  The higher the ARPU, the service take-up and the availability of civil 
infrastructure, the more potentially competitive a market becomes. 
The availability of ducts greatly increases the room for competitive rivalry 
in a given market. This is valid both when ducts are reused from existing 
activities (telecommunications or non-telecommunications) of the NGAN 
operator, and when the ducts can be leased in reasonable terms from their 
telecommunication or non-telecommunication owners. 
These conclusions may have implications in the regulatory processes: 
•  Differential regulatory treatment to different geographic areas will be in 
line with the underlying economics of NGNs. Market analyses should 
therefore be performed separately for sub-national markets with 
homogeneous competitive situations. 
•  Regulatory authorities should expect market analyses to arrive at the 
conclusion that there is not any operator with significant market power in 
many sub-national markets. 
•  In the cases when a market analysis considers to have found 
significant market power in a broadband operator, imposing to it (and 
eventually to other duct owners) the obligation to lease them in reasonable 
terms to other NGAN operators could be a sufficient remedy to make the 
market competitive enough in most areas. Where there are no ducts and/or 
population density is very low, the competitive potential of wireless networks 
should also be taken into account. 
 
* * * 
Annex: data on NGAN deployment in Western European countries 
Germany 
In some areas, like Hamburg, three networks compete: FTTH (Hansenet), FTTN (DT) 
and HFC (Kabel Deutschland). Late entry by cable operator, in some cases as the 
third player, shows that investors do not see two existing players as an 
insurmountable entry barrier. B. SORIA & F. HERNÁNDEZ-GIL  39 
Table 6 - NGAN deployments in Germany 
Entry order  Existing 
business 







st mover  Telephone  DT  FTTN-VDSL 2005  8,300,000  600,000 
Utility Net  Cologne FTTB 2006  150,000  23,000 
Utility  Wilhelm Tel   FTTH  2005  100,000  25,000 
Utility 




Municipality M-Net  FTTB  10/2007  110,000  9,000 
3
rd mover  Cable  Kabel Deutschland HFC   02/2010  n/a  n/a 
(*) We treat all those entrants as second movers because their coverage areas do not overlap in 
general, with minor exceptions in Hamburg. 
(**) HanseNet Telekommunikation GmbH's original shareholders were e.Biscom S.p.A., Milan 
holding 80% and Hamburgische Electricitäts-Werke (HEW) holding 20% of the shares. It was 
subsequently sold to telecommunications operator Telecom Italia and afterwards to Telefónica. 
Source: IDATE, company websites 
Portugal 














st mover  Telephone  PT  FTTH  2007  70,000  5,000 
2
nd mover  ULL  Sonaecom FTTH  9/2008  60,000  6,000 
3
rd mover  Cable  Zon  HFC   02/2009  100,000  8,000 
Source: IDATE, company websites 
Italy 
Alternative operators made a very early bet on FTTH technologies to compete with 
the incumbent Telecom Italia, which took several years to react. 










Utility Fastweb  FTTH  2003  2,000,000  300,000  1
st 
mover 
(*)  Municipality TerreCablate FTTB  2004  91,000  20,000 
2
nd 
mover  Telephone  Telecom 
Italia 
FTTN – 
VDSL  2007 30,000  3,000 
3
rd 
mover  ULL/mobile  To be 
defined 





(*) We treat both entrants as first movers because their coverage areas do not overlap. 
(**) At present time, this project is just an announcement from Fastweb, Vodaphone and Wind. 
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In 2010, the main alternative operators in Italy (Fastweb fixed, Vodafone and Wind 
mobile) announced a plan to jointly build a FTTH network to compete with Telecom 
Italia's. Since no final plan has been unveiled, no financial commitment has been 
made by current partners, and the project is still open in principle to the participation 
of Telecom Italia, it cannot be assessed at this time what the potential impact of this 
project will be in the market. We can nevertheless conclude that alternative operators 
consider that there is a positive business case for a second/third NGA network in 
several parts of Italy. 
France 
Availability of third-party ducts for lease has eased the entry of two ULL players. 
Investors consider that a city like Paris can sustain four fibre network operators.  












st mover  Cable  Numéricable  HFC   06/2006  4,100,000  175,000 
2
nd mover  ULL  Iliad  FTTH  09/2006  350,000  15,000 
3
rd mover  Telephone France Télécom  FTTH  12/2006  582,800  30,700 
4
th  mover  ULL  SFR/Neuf FTTH  2007  350,000 30,000 
Source: IDATE, company websites 
Switzerland 
In some areas, like Zurich, three networks have been deployed. It is interesting to 
note that Swisscom has first deployed VDSL as a quick, but temporary solution to 
countervail the threat from alternative operators, and has afterwards undertaken the 
building of a more performing FTTH network. 














st mover  Utility   TV Sierre 
Vario 
FTTH 3/2007  6,200  3,000 
2










(*) Utility  ewz.zürinet FTTH  10/2007  15,000  1,500 
3
rd mover  Cable  Cablecom  HFC   2009  1,000,000  0 
(**) 
(*) We consider ewz.zürinet as second mover because the absolute first mover (TV Sierre Vario) 
has no coverage in Zürich, and therefore in its coverage area Swisscom was actually the first 
mover. 
(**) Cablecom's Fibre Power service was only launched in September 2009. 
Source: IDATE, company websites 
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The Netherlands 
Interestingly, first movers in the Dutch market were companies from outside the 
broadband and utility markets. This is not contradictory to our modelling; as cables 
are not conveyed through ducts in the Netherlands, but usually just buried in the 
ground, existing ducts or cables do not bring such a large cost advantage as in the 
rest of Europe. Cable and telecommunications incumbents reacted, and it should be 
noted that KPN chose to acquire a stake in new entrant Reggefiber rather than 
upgrading its existing copper network. 














st mover  Start-up  Reggefiber FTTH  2005  400,000  120,000 
2
nd mover  Other  Portaal 
(*) FTTH  2006  55,000  15,000 
3
rd mover  Municipality Amsterdam 
CityNet 
FTTH 2007  44,000  N.a. 
(**) 
4
th mover  Cable  UPC  HFC   03/2008     
5
th mover  Telephone  KPN  FTTH  05/2008 
(***) 400,000  120,000 
(*) Portaal is a Dutch social housing association 
(**) Amsterdam CityNet sells only wholesale services. 
(***) KPN did not launch FTTH services using its preexisting network assets, but by entering an 
agreement with Reggefiber.  Figures for both companies are those of Reggefiber. 
Source: IDATE, company websites 
Denmark 
There are also several players, although the fact that TDC owns both the copper pair 
and cable networks reduces the number of potential entrants. 














st mover  Utility  TRE FOR FTTH  2006  60,000  15,000 
2
nd mover  Utility  SEAS-
NVE 
FTTH 07/2006  52,000  10,500 
3
rd mover  Utility  Dong 
Energy 
(*) 
FTTH   2007  150,000  22,000 
4
th mover  Telephone/Cable TDC  FTTN-VDSL 1/2008  80,000  30,000 
(*) TDC acquired Dong Energy operations in 2009 
Source: IDATE, company websites 
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Belgium 
As in the case of Swisscom, Belgacom has decided to upgrade its network in two 
stages: a first, quick upgrade to VDSL, and eventually a migration to FTTH. 























Cable Telenet HFC    2008 2,000  1,950  2
nd 
mover 
(**)  Cable Brutélé/VOO FTTH  2009 1,000  400 
(*) Belgacom does not disclose the technology it uses to deliver services to its customers 
(**) We consider both cable operators as second movers because their coverage areas do not 
overlap 
Source: IDATE, company websites B. SORIA & F. HERNÁNDEZ-GIL  43 
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